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BANKING SETOFF-
A STUDY IN COMMERCIAL OBSOLESCENCE
If a depositor with any bank also uses a credit card of the bank,
the bank has the right to debit ins account for any indebtedness me-
curred on the credit card account without prior warning and whether or
not the depositor agreed thereto in advance. Under existing law, tins
right is known as a banker's right of setoff.1 Although the principle
is derived from equitable and statutory setoff doctrines under winch the
mutual demands or obligations are deemed compensated insofar as they
equal each other,2 banking setoff is different in that it involves the
special relationship of bank and depositor and the practice of debiting
the latter's demand deposit without ins consent.
Because of a recent and notable increase in consumer legislation
and the expanding protection of procedural due process,4 the banking
setoff procedure is ripe for re-evaluation. For example, The Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968 is designed to require forewarning be-
fore setoff.5 Similarly, principles of prior notice and a hearing based on
Snadach v Family Finance Corp.6 are designed to prevent the depri-
vation of a significant property interest without compliance with con-
stitutional safeguards.
Tins note will illustrate how the equitable principle upon which
setoff is based has been lost in the inequitable practice by examining
the growth and present status of banking setoff, including current
abuses of the practice. It will conclude with an analysis of the setoff
practice in light of consumer legislation and the constitutional protec-
tion afforded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as interpreted in Snadach and later related decisions.
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3054 (West 1954). See notes 11-17 & accompanying text
infra.
2. See note 45 & accompanying text infra.
3. "Nothing before has quite equaled this rush to respond to the needs, desires
and grievances of the buying public. In federal agencies alone, there are an esti-
mated 400 different consumer programs.
In just the last three years, Congress has passed a dozen major consumer
laws. Pending in the House and Senate are some 150 similar bills, some of them
sure to be voted into law this year." U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Feb. 2, 1970, at 44.
4. See notes 96-154 & accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 61-76 & accompanying text infra.
6. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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Banking Setoff in General
Setoff and the Banker's Lien
Banking setoff is an offshoot of the venerable banker's lien which
arose as part of the law merchant and was absorbed into English com-
mon law.' The general rule has evolved that a banker has a lien on all
property in his possession that belongs to a customer for the balance
due the bank from such customer in the ordinary course of business.
The doctrine enjoys wide acceptance, with a majority of jurisdictions
perpetuating it by judicial decision8 and a minority by statute.' A
7. Brandao v. Barnett, 136 Eng. Rep. 207 (C.P. 1846); Jourdaine v. Lefevre,
170 Eng. Rep. 282 (N.P. 1793). For a general background on the common law
banker's lien see 1 L. JONES, LIENS § 241-42 (3d ed. 1914); 2 T. MICHIE, BANKS AND
BANKING § 136 (1913); 1 J. MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING § 324 (6th ed. 1928).
8. Alabama: Batson v. Alexander City Bank, 179 Ala. 490, 60 So. 313 (1912);
Lehman Bros. v. Tallasse Mfg. Co., 64 Ala. 567 (1879). Alaska: Holman v. Tjosevig,
6 Alaska 690 (1922). Arizona: American Sur. Co. v. De Escalada, 47 Ariz. 457,
56 P.2d 665 (1936). Arkansas: Cockrill v. Joyce, 62 Ark. 216, 35 S.W. 221 (1896).
Colorado: Italian Am. Bank v. Carosella, 81 Colo. 214, 254 P. 771 (1927); Wyman v.
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 5 Colo. 30, 40 Am. R. 133 (1879). Georgia: Aiken v. Bank
of Georgia, 101 Ga. App. 200, 113 S.E.2d 405 (1960). Illinois: Niblack v. Park Nat'l
Bank, 169 Ill. 517, 48 N.E. 438 (1897); Fourth Nat'l Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 68 Ill.
398 (1873). Iowa: Andrew v. American Say. Bank, 218 Iowa 489, 255 N.W. 871
(1934). Kansas: Kimmel v. Bean, 68 Kan. 598, 75 P. 1118 (1904). Kentucky:
Board of Drainage Comm'rs v. City Nat'l Bank, 231 Ky. 670, 22 S.W.2d 94 (1929).
Maryland: Hayden v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 120 Md. 163, 87 A. 672 (1913). Massa-
chusetts: Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank v. Hub Fruit Co., 285 Mass. 187, 189 N.E. 89
(1934). Michigan: Jersey Shore Trust Co. v. Owosso Say. Bank, 223 Mich. 513, 194
N.W. 588 (1923); Gibbons v. Hecox, 105 Mich. 509, 63 N.W. 519 (1895) (leading
decision). Minnesota: Citizens State Bank v. E.A. Tessman & Co., 121 Minn. 34,
140 N.W. 178 (1913). Mississippi: Love v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 162 Miss. 460,
139 So. 393 (1932) (leading decision). Missouri: Cochrane v. First State Bank, 198
Mo. App. 619, 201 S.W. 572 (1918); Muench v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 11 Mo. App. 144
(1881). New Jersey: Federal Trust Co. v. Conklin, 87 N.J. Eq. 185, 99 A. 109
(1916). New York: Block v. Amsden, 108 Misc. 318, 177 N.Y.S. 604 (Sup. Ct.
1919). Ohio: Bank of Marysville v. Windisch-Mulhauser Brewing Co., 50 Ohio St.
151, 33 N.E. 1054 (1893) (leading decision); Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock
Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 201 N.E.2d 227 (1963). Rhode Island: Greene v. Jack-
son Bank, 18 R.I. 779, 30 A. 963 (1895). South Carolina: Farr-Barnes Lumber Co. v.
Town of St. George, 128 S.C. 67, 122 S.E. 24 (1924). Tennessee: Wagner v. Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., 122 Tenn. 164, 122 S.W. 245 (1909). Texas: Citizens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Yantis, 287 S.W. 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Vermont: Goodwin v.
Barre Say. Bank & Trust Co., 91 Vt. 228, 100 A. 34 (1917). Virginia: Federal Re-
serve Bank v. State & City Bank & Trust Co., 150 Va. 423, 143 S.E. 697 (1928).
West Virginia: Carroll v. Exchange Bank, 30 W. Va. 518, 4 S.E. 440 (1887). Wis-
consin: Curry v. Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 149 Wis. 413, 136 N.W. 549 (1912).
The law is unclear in North Dakota: Bank of Conway v. Stary, 51 N.D. 399,
200 N.W. 505 (1924).
Pennsylvania has refused to accept the common law banker's lien: Appeal of
Liggett Spring & Axle Co., 111 Pa. 291, 2 A. 684 (1886). But see Maryland Cas. Co.
v. National Bank, 320 Pa. 129, 137, 182 A. 362, 365 (1936) (banking setoff).
9. California: CAL. CIV. CoDE § 3054 (West 1954). Idaho: IDAHO CoDE
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common example is the lien on commercial paper left with a bank by its
customer for purposes of collection."
When the doctrine is applied to a general bank deposit, however,
the lien is not a lien at all but what is termed "a right of setoff" based
on general principles of equity. When a depositor opens a general ac-
count (demand deposit) with a bank, a debtor-creditor relationship is
created. The bank has legal title to any money deposited and be-
comes indebted to the depositor in the amount of the deposit; the lat-
ter has a chose in action. 1 That one cannot have a lien on his own
property is self-evident." This syllogism is correct as far as it goes.
At this point courts have determined that the bank has no security
interest in the account because the requirements of a lien are not met.
Instead of limiting banks to statutory setoff, the courts chose to allow
the bank a right of setoff as part of the concept of the banker's lien.
Thus, while the bank is the debtor of its customer, should the customer
become similarly indebted to the bank, the latter has the right under
this hybrid lien to debit the customer's account in satisfaction of his in-
debtedness to the bank. This procedure is accomplished without re-
sort to formal judicial proceedings, legal or equitable.13 Moreover, the
right exists apart from any setoff statute 4 and operates automatically
§ 45-808 (1948). Montana: MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 45-1111 (1947). Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 32 (1961). South Dakota: S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 44-
11-11 (1967).
10. Joyce v. Auten, 179 U.S. 591 (1900); First Trust & Say. Bank v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co., 214 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1954) (dictum); Goggin v. Bank of
America, 183 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1950).
The Uniform Commercial Code includes a provision embodying the concept of
the banker's lien as applied to the bank collection process. However, the official com-
ment makes it clear that the section does not abrogate nor supplant the banker's
lien, but merely extends its application. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-208,
Comment 1.
11. Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank, 168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228 (1910); Gon-
salves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105 P.2d 118, 121 (1940). 1. MORSE,
BANKS AND BANKING § 324 (6th ed. 1928). See generally 11 CALIF. L. Rnv. 111
(1923). But cf. 10 Ir.L. L. REv. 602, 607 (1916) (espousing theory that banker should
be considered in fiduciary position).
12. An ingenious, if not ingenuous, argument has been made that one can
have a lien on his debt to another. 9 HARv. L. R.v. 146 (1895). However, the con-
tention is based on the false premise that the genuine lien and a right of setoff have
the same substantive effect. Yet it is clearly impossible, short of casuistic distinctions,
to have a lien on one's own property. See generally 2 T. MicmE, BANKS AND BANKING
§ 136 (1913).
13. Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105 P.2d 118, 121
(1940); Nelson v. Bank of America, 76 Cal. App. 2d 501, 509, 173 P.2d 322, 327
(1946).
14. Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105 P.2d 118, 121
(1940). One authority offers this rationale for the rule: "[rhe right of set-off] is
independent of the statute of set-off, because it is an equitable right of set-off arising
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in those cases where it is applicable."5 Finally, by the majority view
the right is exercisable unless the depositor objects prior to exercise. 6
The depositor's prior consent is unnecessary.'
7
Thus, banking setoff allows a bank in the position of creditor to
rely on a security interest of which the customer is unaware.' 8  The
practice of peremptorily debiting the customer's account before proof
of his indebtedness to the bank is only one example of how banking
setoff has diverged from the equitable principles on which it was os-
tensibly founded. 19
from the mutual dealings or transactions of the bank and the other party. Since it
has been the custom for banks to deal with depositors and customers with the
understanding and on the faith and expectation that a set-off shall be allowed, and
since such dealings are generally understood to be part of the business of banking,
courts of equity may the more readily find an implied contract when a bank is in-
volved, than in other cases. After the implied contract is found, set-off will be
allowed." Clark, Set-off in Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvency and Receivership,
34 HARV. L. REV. 178, 194 (1921). However, none of the California decisions make
any reference to the rationale of an implied contract. But see Allen v. Bank of
America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127, 136 P.2d 345, 347 (1943).
One court has noted that banking setoff also exists apart from any statutory
banker's lien. Kasparek v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 209, 39 P.2d 127, 129
(1935).
15. Bromberg v. Bank of America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 135 P.2d 689, 692
(1943); accord, Goggin v. Bank of America, 183 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
16. Walters v. Bank of America, 52 P.2d 232 (1935), aff'd on rehearing, 9 Cal.
2d 46, 69 P.2d 839 (1937). Turkington v. First Nat'l Bank, 97 Conn. 303, 116 A. 241
(1922); Furber v. Dane, 203 Mass. 108, 89 N.E. 227 (1909); Security State Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank, 78 Mont. 389, 254 P. 417 (1927).
17. First Nat'l Bank v. Coplen, 39 Cal. App. 619, 620, 179 P. 708 (1919);
Joseph v. Carter, 382 Ill. 461, 47 N.E.2d 471 (1943).
In an odd approach, the court in Gardner v. First Nat'l Bank, 10 Mont. 149,
25 P. 29 (1890) ignored the banker's lien entirely and held that the death of the de-
positor revoked the bank's power to setoff the depositor's indebtedness against his ac-
count, drawing an analogy between a bank's right of setoff and a power in trust.
18. There are an estimated 3.2 million BankAmericards in use in California, rep-
resenting almost two million accounts. Approximately 44 percent of the card holders
pay their monthly bill with Bank of America checks and another 15 percent pay in
person at one of the bank's 997 branches. It is possible, therefore, that some 59
percent or almost 1.2 million holders of the BankAmericard also maintain general ac-
counts with Bank of America. These accounts serve as additional collateral for the
customer's indebtedness on the credit card and are subject to banking setoff upon de-
fault. Information courtesy of BankAmericard Administration Center, 1 So. Van Ness
Ave., San Francisco, California.
For an interesting look at the charge account banker see 36 CONSUMER REPORTS
49 (1971).
19. There are, however, some restrictions imposed on the exercise of setoff.
Since the indebtedness between the bank and depositor must be mutual, setoff will not
be allowed where the account was opened for a special or limited purpose. Reynes
v. Dumont, 130 U.S. 354 (1889); Smith v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 196 Ark. 685,
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Illustrations of the Substantive Evil
The setoff of a customer's indebtedness without notice or regard
to his protests, is probably the most common example of the inequity
of the bank's right. There are, in addition, certain other benefits which
accrue to the bank along with this right which are detrimental not
only to its customer but to certain of the customer's other creditors. The
following are a few examples.
Under the Federal Bankruptcy Act
Under the Bankruptcy Act20 the trustee of the bankrupt may
avoid certain transfers by the bankrupt to a creditor if the transfer
would give the creditor a preference over other creditors of the same
class.21 A "preferential transfer" is defined as
[A] transfer . . . of any of the property of a debtor to or for
the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt,
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four
months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiat-
ing a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will
be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than some other creditor of the same class.
22
Therefore, when an insolvent debtor deposits money in a bank within
four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, and the bank
sets off the amount of the deposit in satisfaction of an antecedent ob-
ligation due the bink by the debtor, the bank should be considered
as having a preference. Accordingly, it should be compelled to turn
over the amount of the deposit and file a claim along with the other
creditors of the depositor for its own pro rata dividend out of the es-
tate assets2 8 To allow setoff in such an instance will allow the bank
119 S.W.2d 556 (1938); Powell v. Bank of America, 53 Cal. App. 2d 458, 128 P.2d
123 (1942). But cf. Continental & Commercial Trust & Say. Bank v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 229 U.S. 435 (1913) (where small balance from a special deposit re-
mained, bank was allowed setoff). Setoff will also be disallowed if the deposit is a
trust account of which the bank had actual or constructive knowledge. Purdy v.
Bank of America, 2 Cal. 2d 298, 40 P.2d 481 (1935). In addition, if the debt to the
bank is yet unmatured, no setoff is allowed, American Sur. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 63
Cal. App. 149, 218 P. 466 (1923); Zollinger v. First Nat'l Bank, 126 Okla. 182, 259
P. 141 (1926), unless the indebted depositor is also insolvent. Norris v. Commercial
Nat'l Bank, 231 Ala. 204, 163 So. 798 (1935); Barrios & Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co.,
101 Cal. App. 675, 282 P. 386 (1929); Parker v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Okla. 70,
220 P. 39 (1923). An agreement by the depositor that the bank may setoff against
an unmatured debt is binding. Brown v. Maguire's Real Estate Agency, 343 Mo. 336,
121 S.W.2d 754, (1938).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1-1103 (1970).
21. See Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970).
22. Id. § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1).
23. Id. § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b); Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bank-
ruptcy Law, 31 MiN. L. Rnv. 401, 422, 425 (1947).
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to obtain a greater percentage of its debts to the detriment of the in-
solvent depositor's other creditors.
Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Act does recognize and allow set-
off under certain conditions.24 Setoff will be disallowed only if the
transfer to the creditor claiming setoff was made within four months
before filing of the petition and the creditor had knowledge that the
bankrupt was insolvent. 25 Thus, setoff by a bank should be disallowed
if the deposit was made within four months of the filing and the bank
had knowledge or notice that the depositor was insolvent. The result,
however, has been just the opposite. Setoff has been allowed, giv-
ing the bank a preference over the other creditors, unless the transfer
was made expressly to give the bank a preference.26 In New York
County National Bank v. Massey27 the United States Supreme Court al-
lowed setoff where the bank knew of its depositor's insolvency. The
Court said that there was no "transfer" and the provision against pref-
erential transfers did not apply. The theory propounded was that a de-
posit cannot be a transfer of part of the debtor's estate because the
debtor has the right to withdraw it at any time. The Court also found
that there could be no transfer without a "diminution of the estate" of
the debtor.28  The section2 9  defining "transfer", however, was
amended in 1952 to include every possible means of "parting with
property."3  Whether such a broad definition is now sufficient to cover
a bank deposit remains undecided. Further litigation should be antic-
ipated to clarify the issue.
At present, however, setoff is subject to criticism as clearly con-
trary to the intent of the Bankruptcy Act. Decisions reiterate that the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable distribu-
tion of the bankrupt's estate. 1 While "equitable" does not necessarily
mean "equal," if a creditor is to be preferred over others it should be
24. Bankruptcy Act §§ 68, 60(c), 11 U.S.C. §H 108, 96(c) (1970).
25. Id. § 68(b), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b), construed in United States v. Columbia
Erection Corp., 134 F. Supp. 305 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
26. In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 212 F. 397 (2d Cir. 1914); Gates v. First
Nat'l Bank, 1 F.2d 820 (E.D. Va. 1924). But mere knowledge by the bank that its
depositor is in a financial bind will not render a subsequent setoff a preferential
transfer. Drugan v. Crabtree, 299 F. 115 (4th Cir. 1924); Fourth Nat'l Bank v.
Smith, 240 F. 19 (8th Cir. 1916).
27. 192 U.S. 138 (1904), criticized in 10 ILL. L. REv. 602, 607 (1916); accord,
Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523 (1913).
28. 192 U.S. at 147.
29. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970).
30. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 1(h), 66 Stat. 420, amending 11 U.S.C.
§ 1(30) (1970).
31. E.g., United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959);
Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930).
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clear from the statute.12  No part of the Act says that a bank should
enjoy a preferential position and the happenstance of its status as a
depositary for its customers' funds is certainly not a rational reason for
giving it a preference.3 3
As a Preference against Decedents' Estates
Preferences by way of banking setoff are not limited to the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Notwithstanding statutory provisions governing the order
and manner of the payment of claims against a decedent's estate, bank-
ing setoff again works a preference in favor of the bank in such cases.
California Probate Code section 950 specifies that all liens, debts
and charges against a decedent's estate be discharged in a particular
order .3  Liens take priority over nonlien judgments and all other de-
mands against the estate not ranked higher than liens.3 5 Should a
bank have notes and securities in its possession belonging to an in-
debted customer when the latter dies, the bank has a true statutory
lien. After filing its claim against the estate,3 6 the bank should be
paid from estate assets according to its lien priority.
If the indebted customer had been maintaining only a general
demand deposit with the creditor bank, the bank could only have a
right of setoff since a true lien under such circumstances is impossible.
3 7
Under present law, that bank account would pass to the estate adminis-
trator subject to any right of setoff in the bank. In Ainsworth v. Bank
of California38 counsel for the estate argued that to allow the bank a
right of setoff would allow it to satisfy all its claims against the es-
tate to the prejudice of other creditors. The court responded that
the general rule [is] stated to be that the administrator can only
maintain such claims as the testator or intestate might have suc-
cessfully asserted if living. . . . We do not think the case before
us would be an exception to the general rule. . or that the cred-
itors 'of the estate would stand in any better position than the
testator would himself have stood had he lived and had drawn
his check after his note was due. and had been refused payment.39
32. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952).
33. A proposed amendment in the Chandler bill which would have limited
banking setoff under conditions where other transfers would be voidable preferences
never appeared in the Chandler Act of 1952. Banker opposition caused the amend-
ment to be stricken. J. MACLAcHLAN, LAW OF BANKRuPTCY § 292, at 343 (1956).
34. CAL. PROB. CODE § 950 (WestSupp. 1971).
35. Expenses of administration, of the funeral, of the last illness, a family al-
lowance, debts having a preference by the laws of the United States and certain wages
up to $900 are all ranked above liens in priority of payment. Id.
36. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 701 (West 1956); Id. § 707 (West Supp. 1971).
37. See notes 11-12 & accompanying text supra.
38. - 119 Cal. 470, 51 P. 952 (1897).
39. Id. at 476, 51 P. at 954.
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Since Ainswdrth, section 950 of the Probate Code, referred to above,
was enacted governing the order of payment.40  This code provision
does not make it clear whether A insworth is still viable. Thus far, the
decision has gone -unchallenged, although it has not been cited in this
regard in any subsequent rulings since 1922."1
Irrespective of its current validity, however, the A insworth doc-
trine of banking setoff was only the beginning. Later decisions broad-
ened the doctrine as against decedent's estates. In Pendleton v. Hell-
man Commercial Trust & Savings Bank4 2 the court held that the de-
fendant did not have to first file a claim as required by the Probate
Code before exercising setoff. Yet, in Reveal v. Stell,43 decided a few
months earlier by the same court, an individual creditor was not allowed
the defense of setoff because he failed to first file a claim against the
estate. The facts of both cases make it clear that the decedent owed
money to both creditors. However, because the creditor in one case was
a bank exercising setoff, the court reasoned that there was no need to
meet the filing requirement. Since the filing statute appears to apply to
all claims against an estate sounding in contract,44 it is anomalous to
require an individual creditor to file a claim against the estate but not
to require the same of a creditor bank. Two possible answers for this
inconsistent result are either that (1) the bank acquired a more advan-
tageous position because of its status as a bank, or (2) the court
erred in requiring the individual creditor to file a claim where mu-
tual demands existed between the creditor and decedent at the time of
the latter's death.
Since the statutory setoff provided in section 440 of the Code of
Civil Procedure45 operates automatically, one writer has suggested that
the mutual claims of two debtors are extinguished without their prior
knowledge or agreement.4 6  If this is correct then requiring a claim to
be filed before automatic setoff is a useless act. But if other creditors
40. CAL. PROB. CODE § 950 (West Supp. 1971) was enacted in 1931. Cal.
Stat. 1931, ch. 281, § 950, at 650, as amended, Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1084, § 1, at 2814.
41. The decision is cited in passing in Pendleton v. Hellman Commercial Trust
& Sav. Bank, 58 Cal. App. 448, 453, 208 P. 702, 705 (1922).
42. 58 Cal. App. 448, 208 P. 702 (1922).
43. 56 Cal. App. 463, 205 P. 875 (1922).
44. CAL. PROB. CODE § 707 (WestSupp. 1971).
45. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 440 (West 1954) provides:
"When cross-demands have existed between persons under such circumstances
that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have
been set up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated, so far as they equal each
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of
the other."
46. Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: "Compensatio" From
Rome to California, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 224, 224-25 (1965).
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are involved and the debtor is insolvent, an inequitable result ensues.
For example, assume an insolvent'decedent owed $50,000 to each of
six creditors, including the bank where he. maintained a general de-
mand deposit. At his death, the account had a balance of $50,000
which represented the entire assets of. the estate. Notwithstanding that
secti6n 950 of the Probate Code. requires that-all claims be paid in a
particular order, Ainsworth dictates that the bank be allowed setoff of the
decedent's indebtedness against the full'balance of his account. .The re-
sult is a fully compensated bank and fnothing for the other five credi-
tors-or for expenses of the funeral or last illness.'
The same writer recognizing the automatic extinction of cross-de-
mands under section 440 notes' that there may be a waiver of the right
since setoff will not be forced on a party against his will.4 7  Similarly,
waiver of banking setoff should occur under like circumstances since
setoff is not imposed on a bank against its will. But the circumstances
giving rise to a waiver of banking setoff are unclear.48  Ainsworth
and Pendleton idicate that the bank can declare setoff by making a
book entry as late as when the estate administ'rator seeks to recover
the deposit. This is apparently true even though the bank allowed the
decedent to withdraw funds while the bank had the right to exercise
setoff. This result is no doubt due to the construction of setoff as a
"right" not a "duty." For if the bank had the "duty" to exercise setoff,
a delay or failure to do so should effect a waiver the same as it would
under section 440.49
Thus, banking setoff in this instance may be summarized as fol-
lows: it may be exercised against an estate account without first filing
a claim. Accordingly, depending on the amount of the account and the
47. A waiver may occur if, for example, X owes Y store $500 and an employee
of Y store negligently injures X, inflicting the same amount of damages. X may refuse
to pay the bill and consider the: two demands as extinguished. If Y store sues to
collect the $500, X may answer by way of a counter-claim. Alternatively, X could
choose to sue Y store in court in order to protect his credit rating and thereby waive
his right to offset. X would then be obligated to pay the $500 bill to Y store.
See id. at 224, 268. See, e.g., Franck v. J.J. Sugarman-Rudolph Co., 40 Cal. 2d 81, 90,
251 P.2d 949, 954 (1952).
48. In Walters v. Bank of America, 9 Cal. 2d 46, 55, 69 P.2d 839, 843 (1937),
where a garnishee bank claimed a debt due it from the debtor as a setoff, the court
held that the bank had to actually apply such debt against the amount in the de-
positor's account. If, instead, it paid the amount in the account to the debtor, the pay-
ment would be deemed an admission that there was no debt due the bank and its claim
of setoff would be denied. The decision is of doubtful validity today on the subject of
attachment of bank accounts because of Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), but is still notable in that it never men-
tions a waiver by the bank of its right to, setoff. •
49. See Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: "Compensatio" from
Rome to California, 53 CALm. L. REv. at 268, 274 n.300 (1965).
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amount of the bank's claim, the bank may be fully compensated while
the estate's other creditors are left with only their copies of notarized
claims-filed but to no avail.
Setoff Against the Estate for Indebtedness Incurred by the
Administrator in Continuing the Business of the Decedent
A perplexing problem is raised when the estate administrator seeks
to carry on the decedent's former business for the welfare of the estate.50
The right of setoff again may work an injustice best illustrated by a
hypothetical situation: Decedent had owned a financially troubled en-
terprise which the estate administrator is authorized to continue. The
administrator obtains a loan from the bank of $10,000 and opens a
general account with the lender in which to keep receipts from the bus-
iness. The business-the sole asset of the estate-ends in insolvency
and the account has a balance of $9,000. May the bank setoff and
thereby be 90% compensated on its loan to the estate? In Estate of
Smith51 the general factual situation above occurred, except the ad-
ministrator did not open an account with the bank. The court had lit-
tle trouble reaching the conclusion that the loan did not give the bank
a preferential claim as "expenses of administration" or a lien on the
assets of the estate, but was a mere debt owing the bank from the assets
of the estate (in effect, holding the bank was but a lowest ranked gen-
eral creditor). The court felt that to allow the bank a preference would
"defeat the very spirit and purpose of the probate law which seeks to
distribute the property of an estate to the heirs, legatees and creditors
of the decedent as speedily and in as unimpaired a condition as possi-
ble."52  But under present law, if the administrator had opened an ac-
count with the bank which loaned the funds, setoff would be allowed
and the "spirit and purpose" of probate ostensibly defeated.5 3
In Estate of Allen. 4 the lender was not even a bank and the court
again refused to allow preferential payment to the lender. The court
felt that the legislature did not intend to give those loaning money to
the estate preferential status. 5  That was a worthy conclusion, of
50. CAL. PROB. CODE § 572 (West 1956) allows the administrator to carry on
the decedent's business during administration for benefit of the estate. Section 830
permits the administrator to borrow money for this purpose.
51. 16 Cal. App. 2d 239, 60 P.2d 574 (1936).
52. Id. at 243, 60 P.2d at 576.
53. While the account may be held in trust for the benefit of the estate, such
facts are not chargeable to the bank if it had no knowledge of this purpose. See
note 19 supra.
54. 42 Cal. App. 2d 346, 108 P.2d 973 (1941).
55. Id. at 352, 108 P.2d at 976-77.
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couise, but again illustrates the injustice of the banking setoff where
the interests of other creditors or heirs are involved.
The Smith decision emphasizes the irony of the situation. To
avoid setoff in the foregoing hypothetical situation, the estate adminis-
trator could simply keep the receipts from the business in a different
bank or not open an account at all.
Avenues of Assault on Banking Setoff
The foregoing discussion dealt with the abuses coexistent with
banking setoff. The purpose of this section is to analyze the poten-
tial of consumer legislation to curb these abuses and of constitutional
safeguards to eliminate them entirely.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act56 and Uniform Consumer
Credit Code57 are the legislative controls to be examined. Their truth-
in-lending provisions may be made directly applicable to security inter-
ests such as banking setoff. Unfortunately, the net effect of both will
only be disclosure of the right of setoff prior to its exercise.
On the other hand, procedural due process as interpreted and
broadened in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.58 is aimed at prevent-
ing the very exercise itself. If the Fourteenth Amendment is appli-
cable, the banking setoff will be subject to the prerequisites of prior
notice and hearing before being exercisable.59 The thesis of this note is
that banking setoff stands in no better position than the attachment
and garnishment statutes which have recently been held unconstitu-
tional.60
Finally, the reader should note that neither consumer legislation
nor the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to destroy the exercise of
banking setoff completely. However, if the major or sole advantage
to the practice is the abuse which it allows, removal of the abuses
should emasculate the practice and render it an obsolete commercial
practice.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act
In 1968 Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act61
[CCPA] which purpose was to reform the consumer credit industry.
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970).
57. See text accompanying notes 80-95 infra.
58. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See notes 96-154 & accompanying text infra.
59. Id.
60. E.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Randone v.
Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970).
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Its most familiar provisions relate to truth-in-lending under which a
creditor must make certain disclosures prior to the extension of any
credit. 2 One such disclosure is the possible retention or acquisition of
a security interest by the creditor in the borrower's property. 3 The
requirements are three-fold: (1) disclosure must be made prior to the
extension of credit; (2) the disclosure must set forth how the security
interest will be either retained or acquired; and (3) the disclosure must
include a description of the interests retained or acquired. To these
three requirements should be added the one specifically mentioned
in the statute itself:
a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will
be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available
to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
6 4
Banking setoff has yet to be construed in light of the CCPA but
prior California decisions shed light on the nature of the bank's right.
While not a technical lien, "it is in the nature of a lien or security in-
terest in the funds, similar to and enforceable in the same way as the
lien against commercial paper."6' 5 Regulation Z,66 promulgated by the
Federal Reserve System and intended to be interpretative of the CCPA,67
defines a security interest as
any interest in property which secures payment or performance of
an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited to, security
interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mort-
gages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens
whether or not recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and
62. Id. §§ 1601-65.
63. Id. § 1637(a) (7), which reads in pertinent part:
"Before opening any account under an open end consumer credit plan, the creditor
shall disclose to the person to whom credit is to be extended each of the following
items, to the extent applicable:
(7) The conditions under which the creditor may retain or acquire any se-
curity interest in any property to secure the payment of any credit extended under the
plan, and a description of the interest or interests which may be so retained or ac-
quired."
An open end credit plan is defined as a "plan prescribing the terms of credit
transactions which may be made thereunder from time to time and under the terms of
which a finance charge may be computed on the outstanding unpaid balance from
time to time thereunder." Id. § 1602(i). This definition includes the revolving
charge account. See generally Brandel, Open End Credit Disclosure, 26 Bus. LAW.
815 (1971); Buerger, Revolving Credit and Credit Cards, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
707 (1968).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970) (emphasis added).
65. Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173-74, 105 P.2d 118, 121
(1940) (emphasis added).
66. FRB REG. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (Supp. 1972).
67. Courts must take judicial notice of the regulation, 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1970).
It is also prima facie evidence of the contents of the statute; id. § 1510(e).
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other similar liens,68 vendor's liens in both real and personal prop-
erty, the interest of a seller in a contract for the sale of real prop-
erty, any lien on property arising by operation of law,69 and
any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or perform-
ance of an obligation.
70
As a security interest, therefore, any right of setoff must be disclosed
prior to the extension of credit. How the right is retained or acquired
and a description of the interests against which setoff may be used must
also be disclosed. These requirements, according to one authority,
should already have been complied with by banking institutions.71
Yet, another writer notes that disclosure after credit is extended may be
insufficient. 72  Clearly, however, prior disclosure of banking setoff
is not being made by banks under their credit card arrangements.
73
Regulation Z makes it mandatory that
68. This particular phrase may include the true banker's lien, CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 3054 (West 1954), in that it is similar to the mechanic's lien, id. § 3059, and
materialman's lien, id. § 3051, by virtue of being automatic and nonconsensual.
69. The banker's lien arises by operation of law. Goggin v. Bank of America,
183 F.2d 322,- 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); Bromberg v. Bank
of America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 135 P.2d 689, 692 (1943).
70. FRB REG. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
71. "Both with respect to advertising and the actual loan documentation, it
seems ... that banks should have by now reviewed every bank form, leaflet, brochure,
mailing enclosure which was being used to determine whether it is in compliance
with the truth-in-lending requirements." Reuben, Truth-in-Lending: Its Impact on
Banks, 87 BANKI L.J. 3, 24 (1970).
72. "A creditor might not be in compliance by giving a disclosure statement
after the credit was approved." Frank, Preparation of Bank Forms for Regulation Z,
87 BANKING LJ. 307, 322 (1970).
73. Until recently, the following appeared on the BankAmericard application
form: "Regardless of any other agreement existing at the time your BankAmericard
account is opened, your BankAmericard balance is not secured by any contractual
lien. However, the balance may be secured by a Banker's lien, arising under Cal-
ifornia Civil Code, section 3054, upon any property while it is in the Bank's posses-
sion." FoRM TPL 850 SF 4-71 (REV). This is a misleading summary of the
bank's security interest because the banker's lien does not apply to a general demand
deposit, such as a checking account, since one cannot have a lien on his own property,
i.e., a banker cannot have a lien on money deposited which now belongs to him.
See notes 11-12 & accompanying text supra.
The Master Charge application forms may vary with the issuing bank. The
following statement is taken from the disclosure statement of Crocker National Bank
and is probably representative: "To secure payment of any credit extended on the
Account, Bank may retain or acquire a lien on any property coming into its possession,
and if so agreed in writing as to other property, a security interest in such other
property." 71-024 (REV. 5-71). Under this statement, Crocker Bank would clearly
violate the CCPA if it setoff the account of a customer against his credit card ac-
count, without the-prior consent of the customer. Because the bank cannot have a" lien
on general demand accounts, such accounts must be "other property" which requires.
a written agreement. The statement makes no disclosure of any right of setoff, which
is unnecessary if the bank must have prior written agreement before its exercise.
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[i]f the underlying agreement provides for the granting of a
security interest in or lien upon all property of the customer now
or thereafter in the creditor's possession, the customer must be
informed of these facts.
7 4
Finally, one author notes that the interest secured must be designated
with a certain specificity.7" In light of the foregoing interpretation of
the requirements imposed by the CCPA regarding disclosure of se-
curity interests, the following statement is suggested as complying with
the minimum standard. The statement discloses information as to
setoff only and is not intended to cover similar requirements as to
interest rates, periodic charges, minimum payments, etc., which are
also subject to the CCPA:
76
Notwithstanding any other agreement, oral or written, to the
contrary, between you and [name of bank], any amount due
or outstanding on your [name of credit card] account is not
secured by any contractual or consensual lien. However,
the balance due on the amount may be secured by a lien on
any of your property in the possession of [name of bank] by
virtue of the Banker's Lien statute contained in California
Civil Code section 3054. However, the Banker's Lien
statute does not apply to checking accounts and other simi-
lar general demand deposits which you now maintain or
plan to open and maintain in the future with [name of bank].
Nevertheless, any such accounts and deposits may be taken
(debited) and applied to any outstanding balance due on
your [name of credit card] account under [name of bank]
"right of setoff." Such accounts include account no.-
which you are now maintaining with [name of branch] of
[name of bank]. [Name of bank] may debit any of these
accounts and apply the funds contained therein to your
[name of credit card] balance without prior notice. If you
do not desire [name of bank] to have such a right in any
In its most recent mailing enclosure, BankAmericard added the following dis-
closure to the statement earlier in this note: "If you breach your BankAmericard
agreement, the Bank may, without notice, under its 'right of offset,' debit any de-
posit account you may have with the Bank and credit the proceeds to your Bank-
Americard balance." Form TPL 880 8/71 (REV). This additional disclosure was
received more than a year after initial credit was extended by BankAmericard. If
disclosure must be made prior to the extension of credit, setoff should be disallowed
on any credit card balance incurred prior to disclosure of the security interest.
74. Frank, Preparation of Bank Forms for Regulation Z, 87 BANKING L.J. 307,
313 (1970).
75. "If you [the bank] have a security interest in an automobile, you must
identify the vehicle. . . . If your security is a passbook or securities, you must do the
same." Id. at 327.
76. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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accounts you are now or will be maintaining with it, written
notice to that effect must be received by [name of bank]
prior to the use of your [name of credit card].
While somewhat lengthy, the above statement discloses all the bank's
security interests with the specificity and detail envisioned by the CCPA.
Anything less may be insufficient.
BankAmericard, Master Charge and other such bank-cardholder
arrangements are assuming a position of convenient buying power in
this credit-oriented society 71 Thus, from a practical viewpoint, dis-
closure would work no injustice on the bank as the average applicant
will not be dissuaded from applying merely because of a statement as
to the bank's rights. What credit card applicant believes that the
time will come where is checking account will be used to pay off his
credit card balance? Notwithstanding the evident widespread use
78
and abuse79 of all forms of credit, the applicant surely entertains the
notion that the heavily indebted is a class to which he will never belong.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
1, The CCPA is federal legislation covering the entire credit industry.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [UCCC], on the other hand, is
designed for enactment by the states to complement the CCPA. The
two acts are not mutually exclusive. 0 The CCPA specifically pro-
vides that a state may impose substantially similar requirements, in
77. "Bank credit cards, which require payment of interest, represent one of the
fastest growing sectors of the credit industry today." Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in
the Affluent Society, 33 L. & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 641, 645 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Caplovitz]. One report notes that Master Charge can be used to hire an attorney,
employ a caterer, get an electrolysis treatment, pay taxes and are honored m many
major hospitals. LaRiviere, Credit Cards Lift Lid on Holiday Spending, L.A. Times,
Dec. 23, 1971, pt. IV (View) at 8, col. 2.
"To prove the effectiveness of its credit card, the Bank of America hired a San
Francisco secretary to use its card in place of money for one month; she encountered
difficulties only with tolls, taxis, and vending machines." Comment, Bank Credit
Plans: Innovations in Consumer Financing, I LOYOLA L. REv. (Los Angeles) 49,
50-51 n.10 (1968).
78. Caplovitz, supra note 77, at 642.
79. "According to [one] view, credit stimulates impulse buying and irrational
expenditures by making it easier for families to make expensive purchases. The
accusation of families living beyond their means is frequently heard in the credit
society, and the suspicion is that such families are just as apt to be found m the
middle class suburbs as in the ghetto. Obviously, research is needed on this point to
find out the frequency of each outcome and the kinds of families that benefit from, or
are hurt by, the ready availability of credit." Id. at 646.
80. For a comparative study of the CCPA and the UCCC, see a symposium
contained in 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 639 (1968).
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which case the CCPA will acquiesce,"' or possibly stricter require-
ments, in which case compliance with the CCPA will not exempt the
creditor from the stricter state laws.82
According to a recent report, the UCCC has enjoyed only limited
acceptance in the two years since the final draft was issued."' Be-
cause this code is due to be considered by the California legislature in
the 1972 session, banking setoff should be examined in light of the
UCCC.
The UCCC is intended to supplant virtually every existing state
law regulating the credit industry.84  In their place, the UCCC will pro-
vide a uniform system of disclosure requirements applicable to all areas
of credit transactions, including conditional sales contracts, mortgages
and credit cards.
While the CCPA's disclosure requirements apply to credit in all
forms, the UCCC distinguishes between credit extended under a re-
volving charge account (e.g., a department store credit card arrange-
ment) and credit amounting to a tripartite loan arrangement (e.g., the
BankAmericard plan).' 5 However, the UCCC disclosure requirements
applicable to either arrangement are strikingly similar to each other86
and to the CCPA disclosure provision. 7  The language of the CCPA's
"security interest" disclosure provision, for example, is almost identical
with that of the UCCC's which states:
Before making a consumer loan pursuant to a revolving loan ac-
count, the lender shall give the debtor the following information:
81. CCPA § 123, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1970).
82. Id. § 111(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
83. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 9, 1971, at 9, col. 1 (enacted in Oregon and
four other states).
84. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CREDIT CODE [hereinafter cited as UCCCI § 9.103
(1)-(2) (note re Repealer and Amendatory Provisions). This would mean the repeal
of CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1912-16 (West 1954) (usury laws) and id. § 2982 (West Supp.
1971) (motor vehicle conditional sales contracts). The recent Song-Beverly Credit
Card Act would also have to be included in this group. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1019,
§ 1747.50 at 2152. See generally Moo, Legislative Control of Consumer Credit Trans-
actions, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 656, 663 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Moo].
85. Compare UCCC § 1.301(16) (defining seller credit card) with id. § 1.301
(9) (defining lender credit card) and id. § 3.108 (defining revolving loan account).
The code makes it clear that it desires to "treat the single-merchant credit card
as being under the regulatory provisions of the sales article but to treat transactions
under the multiple-purpose credit card as being within the regulatory provisions of the
loan article." Moo, supra note 84, at 664.
86. Compare UCCC § 2.310 (disclosure under merchant credit card plan) with
id. § 3.309 (disclosure under a bank credit card plan).
87. Compare UCCC provisions cited note 91 supra with 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)
(7) (1970) (CCPA provision).
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(g) conditions under which the lender may retain or ac-
quire a security interest in property to secure the balances result-
ing from loans made pursuant to the revolving loan account,
and a description of the interest or interests which may be re-
tamed or acquired.18
The official comment makes it clear that disclosure must be made by
the lender at or prior to the time the buyer receives a credit card or is
otherwise enabled to use the account. 9 For failure to comply with
the requirements of the code, a variety of civil actions are authorized
including restraining orders, class actions, actions for damages and
civil penalties for willful violations by a creditor or his representative.9 0
Under the Uniform Commercial Code [U3CC], a security interest
agreement must be signed by the debtor before it is enforceable.91 If
banking setoff is subject to the requirement of a prior written agree-
ment, then it is useless, as one writer has noted,92 to also requires
creditors to disclose their security interests. However, banking setoff
as a security interest is not among those types of interests whose en-
forceability must be founded on a prior written agreement. No such
agreement is required by the UCC where the collateral subject to the
interest (demand deposit) is already in the possession of the secured
party (bank)."3 As the money in a customer's demand deposit account
is the collateral and is in the possession of the bank, the need to comply
with this requirement of the UCC is obviated. Furthermore, the UCC's
basic provision requiring a prior written agreement is expressly subject
to another section which gives a collecting bank a security interest
similar to the common law banker's lien 94 Because the courts inter-
pret banking setoff as an integral part of the banker's lien, no prior
written agreement is necessary for setoff to be validly exercisable by a
bank.
No present state law acts to curtail the practice of banking set-
off. The UCC section on the banker's lien is presently interpreted to
88. Compare UCCC § 3.309(i)(g) with 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(7) (1970)
(CCPA provision).
89. UCCC § 2.3 10, Comment 1.
90. Id. §§ 6.110-.113(2).
91. UNmiOR ComncuMr. CODE § 9-203(i)(b); CAL. COMM. CODE § 9203
(1) (b) (West 1964); cf. UNiFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302 (financing statement
must be filed to perfect the security interest); id. § 9-402 (filed financial statement
must be signed by debtor).
92. Buerger, Revolving Credit and Credit Cards, 33 L. & CONTMP. PROB. 707,
714 (1968).
93. UNiFoRm ComMERcr. CODE § 9-203(i)(a); CAL. CoM. CODE § 9203
(1) (a) (West 1964).
94. UNwoRm COMMERCuL CODE § 4-208, Comment 1; CAL. COM. CODE § 4208
(West 1964) Comment 1.
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be subject to the banker's lien statute.95 The enactment of the UCCC,
therefore, would fill the void to the extent that more strict enforcement
procedures are available under the UCCC than under the CCPA.
Procedural Due Process
Under present practice, a bank may debit its customer's general
demand deposit account and credit that amount toward diminution or
extinguishment of the customer's indebtedness to the bank. The
"transfer" of the funds, represented by the account, from that account
to another is accomplished without prior notice or hearing as to the
validity of the bank's claim against its depositor.
The third and final thesis of this note is that the practice of set-
off previously illustrated is subject to the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Due process requires that before a state can
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, prior notice and a
hearing must be afforded.9" Since Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,9
the due process clause has been undergoing an expanding interpreta-
tion and many state procedures of long standing are now facing con-
stitutional challenges. Such deficient procedures include prejudgment
garnishment of wages,S bank accounts,99 accounts receivable'00 and
moneys on deposit with a hospital.' Old and venerable lien stat-
utes have been struck down. 10 2  In addition, the termination of wel-
fare benefits' 013 and unemployment compensation benefits' without
95. See authorities cited in note 94 supra.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, construed in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
97. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
98. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Reeves v. Motor
Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court,
105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); McCallop v. Carberry, I Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d
122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970). See generally Note, The Demise of Summary Prejudg-
ment Remedies in California, 23 HASTrNos L.J. 489 (1972).
99. Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). Contra,
American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970) (cor-
poration's checking account); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. App.
103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969) (foreign attachment of bank account).
100. Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d
87 (1970).
101. McConaghley v. City of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 136
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969).
102. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (California innkeeper's
lien); see Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (Texas landlord lien).
103. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
104. Java v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
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prior notice and hearing have been held to fall within the constitutional
mandate of the due process clause. Statutes permitting sales of prop-
erty in distress for rent0 5 and the issuance of writs of repossession'0 "
without also requiring compliance with fundamental due process re-
quirements have likewise been held invalid.
Against this background of growth in the realm of due process
stands the ancient but well-established practice of banking setoff. Two
distinct problems are raised by the practice itself and the law which
has developed around it: first, whether the requisite state action is
present; second, whether there has been the deprivation of a property
interest. The balance of this note will attempt to answer both prob-
lems in the affirmative and to illustrate how a reasonable interpreta-
tion of Sniadach and subsequent decisions does include banking setoff
in that group of now defunct state practices.
The Requisite State Action
The Supreme Court was early to recognize that the "[i]ndividual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Four-
teenth] amendment.' 01 7  The Court must find some semblance of state
action involved in the deprivation before the amendment is applica-
ble.10
8
When a bank exercises setoff against a customer's account, it is
generally acting under color of one of two California statutes. The
first is the codified banker's lien.'09 Although setoff is different from
the true lien, apparently banks rely partially on the statutory lien." 0
The second is the statute governing setoff of cross demands."' When
105. Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
106. Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970).
107. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). See generally Black, Fore-
word: 'State Action,' Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv.
L. Rav. 69 (1967); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUm. L. REv. 1083
(1960); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. Rav. 3 (1961); Williams,
The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347 (1963).
108. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). "The fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against an-
other." Id. at 554.
109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3054 (West 1954).
110. Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105 P.2d 118, 121
(1940) (the banker's lien applies to demand deposits but is more correctly called a
right of setoff). See note 73 supra.
111. CAL. Con CIV. PROC. § 440 (West 1954), quoted in full at note 45 supra;
see Ainsworth v. Bank of California, 119 Cal. 470, 474, 51 P. 952, 953 (1897).
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a state statute is involved, sufficient state action is generally found
by the courts." 2
However, the bank need not rely on state statutes in all cases. A
defense against finding state action is that banking setoff is not gov-
erned by either the statutory lien or statutory setoff but instead by
general equitable principles and the mutual dealings of the bank and
depositor."' Such a contention could be based on the facts that the
banker's lien is a part of the English common law and that setoff it-
self is a nonstatutory right in a majority of jurisdictions." 4 In Califor-
nia, however, the English common law is codified and state action can
again be found in statutory involvement." 5 In those jurisdictions
where such is not the case, an alternative ground must be found.
The "public function" doctrine may be applicable to find state ac-
tion in cases involving an institution such as a bank which performs
a public function in an individual capacity. The limitations of this
doctrine, first espoused in Marsh v. Alabama,"6 are unclear,"17 but
company towns," 8 shopping centers," 9 and private parks controlled
by the municipality'20 have been deemed so involved in a public func-
tion that regulation by the state was sufficient state action. State con-
trol and regulation of banking and financial institutions clearly exists.' 2 '
Still another alternate basis for finding state action is the "judicial
112. E.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Nixon v. Her-
don, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
113. See note 14 supra.
114. See notes 7-8 supra.
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (West 1954) (the English common law is the rule
of decision insofar as it does not contravene the Constitution).
116. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
117. When "facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and
since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation."
Id. at 506 (emphasis added). See note 126 infra.
118. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
119. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
120. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
121. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 200-275 (West Supp. 1971). However, there is au-
thority that mere regulation of a public entity is insufficient in the absence of further
state involvement in the actual operations of the regulated institution. E.g., Mulvi-
hill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (in-
sufficient state action where private hospital receiving federal funds and regulated by
state statutes). But see Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th
Cir. 1969) (state action found where similar federal funds being disbursed by state
agency). See generally Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-
Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 933 (1952) (author espouses the doctrine that the corporation should be
subject to the same limitations as the states where the corporation is chartered
and regulated by the state).
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involvement" of the state, a doctrine which the Court assumed as al-
ready recognized by all.122  Under this doctrine, merely because bank-
ing setoff is enforced in the state courts is sufficient state action. Be-
cause the contours of this doctrine are in a state of flux, however, it is
best relied on only as a last resort.
Deprivation of Property
The law has developed that only a debtor-creditor relationship
is established between a bank and its customer, although at least one
writer has suggested that the bank should be held to a fiduciary stand-
ard.12 3 Accordingly, the law has established that money deposited
with a bank becomes its property. 2 4  Clearly, then, there cannot be
a deprivation of any money belonging to the depositor. The relation-
ship of the parties and the practice of setoff itself requires the resolu-
tion of anomalous ideas: by exercising setoff, the bank is clearly de-
priving its customer of the right to draw out money and yet that same
money already belongs to the bank. Therefore, a distinction must be
made between the physical cash dollar and the bank account repre-
senting the same. The depositor does have a chose in action against
the bank which is a recognized property right.'25 By setoff, the bank
is depriving him of the use of his right to withdraw funds.' 26 Thus,
while the bank is not depriving him of his technical chose in action since
the customer may sue to recover the amount set off by the bank, if
the chose in action is viewed as the customer's right to withdraw de-
posited funds on demand, then -use of the chose in action is impaired
by banking setoff. In interpreting California law, the United States Su-
preme Court noted that:
[t]he relationship of bank and depositor is that of debtor and
creditor, founded upon contract. The bank has the right and
duty under that contract to honor checks of its depositor .... 127
122. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 'That the action of state courts
and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been
established by decisions of this Court." Id. at 14; cf. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,
255-57 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring opinion); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
254 (1953).
123. 10 Im. L. Rav. 602, 607-08 (1916).
124. See cases cited note 11 & accompanying text supra.
125. CAL. Cirv. CoDn § 14 (West 1954).
126. "The 'property' of which petitioner has been deprived is the use of the
garnished portion of her wages during the interim period between the garnishment and
the culmination of the main suit." Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
342 (1969) (Harlan, I., concurring); accord, Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 552, 488 P.2d 13, 23, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 719 (1971); cf. United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946).
127. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) (emphasis added)
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If the right to withdraw funds, therefore, is the true property right to
be protected, then a breach of the duty to honor checks, by setoff with-
out prior notice to or consent of the customer, is sufficient depriva-
tion to merit Fourteenth Amendment relief.
A customer's right of withdrawal is not absolute, however. The
UCC recognizes that it is subject to any right in the bank to apply the
deposit to a customer's obligations.' 28 The UCC does not mention
whether an underlying contract is needed to support the bank's right or
whether prior notice or consent of the customer is required. However,
that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws intended to contravene
the due process clause is doubtful.
Finally, it should be noted that setoff is a permanent deprivation
unless the customer wishes to expend the time and money in court to
recover the amount set off. In this way setoff differs from the wage
garnishment statutes, which limited the length of time that property
could be garnished. 1 29
Banking Setoff in Light of Sniadach3
0
Assuming that the requisite state action and deprivation of a sig-
nificant property interest are both present, the final issue presented in
this section is that all setoffs, at least as to bank accounts, should be
forbidden by the due process clause unless prior notice and hearing is
granted.
The impact of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 3' has been per-
vasive and has yet to be reconstrued by the Supreme Court. In addition
to decisions already noted,132 prior notice and hearing have been held re-
quired before seizure of beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, and tables in a re-
plevin action, 33 and before sale of stored property in an unlawful de-
citing Allen v. Bank of America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127, 136 P.2d 345, 347 (1943);
Weaver v. Bank of America, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 431, 380 P.2d 644, 647, 30 Cal. Rptr.
4,7 (1963).
128. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(5).
129. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 542b (West 1954) (maximum of three
years).
130. The Sniadach decision has prompted a rash of literature on its ramifications.
See generally Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. RaV. 942 (1970);
Note, Attachment and Garnishment: The Sniadach Case and its Implications for
Related Areas of the Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 986 (1970); Comment, The Constitu-
tional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837 (1970).
131. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
132. See cases cited in notes 98-106 supra.
133. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970);
accord, Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971)
(under California's claim and delivery statute). Contra, Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.
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tainer action.1 34  On the other hand, the decision has been held not
controlling where the defendant's debtors are attached,13 5 or his prune
crop,136 or real property 3 7 -especially under a writ of foreign attach-
ment.138
In Randone v. Superior Court3 9 the California Supreme Court ruled
that attachment of bank accounts without prior notice and a hearing on
the validity of the attaching creditor's claim was invalid as a violation
of procedural due process. In a unanimous opinion, the court con-
cluded that section 537(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, allowing
attachment of the defendant's property in unsecured contract actions
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. The court interpreted
Sniadach as returning
the entire domain of prejudgment remedies to the long-standing
procedural due process principle which dictates that, except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, an individual may not be deprived of
his life, liberty or property without notice and hearing.
140
The court further noted that a bank account is not unlike wages in
that both represent the "necessities of life" protected in Sniadach.'41
Thus, whether the absence of prior notice and hearing will be decisive
appears to depend on whether the property being taken represents the
"necessities of life." Under banking setoff bank accounts are affected
in the same way that they would be -under garnishment or attachment.
In both the right of the customer to reach the funds represented by
the account is impaired, usually permanently. If, therefore, bank ac-
counts are "necessities of life" as held by the Randone court, the prac-
Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971) (seizure of stove
and stereo under conditional sales contract); Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d
100 (10th Cir. 1970) (seizure of bowling equipment under conditional sales contract).
134. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 27-28, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904, 919-20
(1971).
135. Andrew Brown Co. v. Painters Warehouse, Inc., 11 Ariz. App. 571, 466 P.2d
790 (1970) (dictum); see Western Bd. of Adjusters, Inc. v. Covina Publishing, Inc.,
9 Cal. App. 3d 659, 88 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1970).
136. Johnston v. Cunningham, 12 Cal. App. 3d 123, 128, 90 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490
(1970) (dicta).
137. Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1970).
138. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa.
1971); see Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (attachment to secure quasi'in
rem jurisdiction).
139. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971). See Note, The
Demise of Summary Prejudgment Remedies in California, 23 HASTINGS L.. 489 (1972).
140. 5 Cal. 3d at 547, 488 P.2d at 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 715 (emphasis added).
141. "[rjhe greater the deprivation an individual will suffer by the attachment
of property, the greater the public urgency must be to justify the imposition of that
loss on an individual before notice and a hearing, and the more substantial the pro-
cedural safeguards that must be afforded when such notice and hearing are re-
quired." Id. at 558, 488 P.2d at 28, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
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tice of banking setoff must fall because of its noncompliance with due
process.
However, the courts are not at all certain that all bank accounts
are protected. If a financially stable corporation's checking account is
attached, for example, Sniadach is not deemed applicable; but if the
corporation is a closely-held family corporation, the result may well
be different.' 42 In the first instance the checking account does not
represent "necessities of life" while in the latter the account may rep-
resent the entire assets of the corporation.
Individual accounts, on the other hand, are of a different nature.
The meteoric rise of demand deposit accounts by the individual con-
sumer emphasizes their commercial significance. 113  This growth must
also be considered in light of the increasing practice of banks to be-
come involved in the credit card field.'44 As noted at the outset of
this note,145 setoff may often occur in connection with charges incurred
on the credit card issued by a bank. For example, the situation may
arise where the depositor incurs a $400 debt on his Master Charge
credit card, and reduces it to $200. Later, a dispute arises as to an
item charged to the card and the bank seizes almost the entire amount
in the depositor's checking account. The depositor is not notified of
the setoff until five days later but, in the interim, has written numerous
checks, all of which are dishonored by the offsetting bank, which also
assesses a four dollar fee per check. 46  Furthermore, the merchant-
142. Compare American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D.
Hawaii 1970), with Cinerama, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 436 F.2d 977 (9th
Cir. 1971) (dictum).
143. The following table shows that, in one decennial period, the percentage of
the adult population maintaining checking accounts increased from 41% to 53%. In
1960 over half the adult population maintained a demand deposit account:
Period Adult Population Demand Deposit Accounts Volume of Checks
Total Avg. no.
(millions) (millions) (millions) per acc't
1949 96.4 40.7 1,848 45.4
1955 102.4 52.1 2,644 50.7
1960 108.3 57.1 3,419 59.9
85 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 989, 991 (1962).
Financial institutions have eagerly solicited the average consumer account. One
author noted that "[iln order to make up for the drop in corporate deposits, many
banks aggressively went after the small, individual depositor. Special checking ac-
counts (requiring no minimum balance) and a friendly, welcome-to-the-public image
were the chief avenues of attack. Most banks geared themselves to an all out 'retail'
operation, offering a broad range of banking services in easily accessible branches to
reach an ever-widening segment of the population. The trend has been called a 'shift
from class banking to mass banking.'" B. YAviTz, AUTOMATION IN COMMERCIAL
BANKING 10-11 (1967).
144. See note 77 supra.
145. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
146. Essentially, these are the facts in a suit filed recently in federal court chal-
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payee of the dishonored checks may also levy a fee on the depositor-
drawer. The ultimate indignity, however, is that the depositor's credit
reputation is irreparably damaged with that merchant. Had the de-
positor been given sufficient prior notice, he might have been able to
deposit sufficient funds to prevent his account from being overdrawn.
Disputes over a credit card balance may arise from a number of
causes, including computer error, merchant error, stolen card or ex-
changed goods. 14 7  Once the bank chooses to set off the disputed
charges against the cardholder's demand account, any protests will be
to no avail. The cardholder will probably demur in bringing suit (en-
forcing his chose in action) for the amount of a small purchase which
the bank has debited to his bank account.
To justify the deprivation of a debtor's property interest before
notice and a hearing, some state or creditor interest of overriding
significance must be served.'4 " The arguments made by the attaching
creditor in Randone are strikingly similar to those that the bank might
advance in defending its right of setoff. The creditor in that case con-
tended that creditors would encounter greater difficulty and expense in
collecting debts; that credit rates would consequently be increased;
and that extension of credit to certain high-risk debtors would have to
be terminated.' 49 Yet, empirical studies have discounted the possi-
bility of a tighter credit market merely because of the loss of avail-
able attachment statutes.' 50 Without the benefit of similar studies on
lenging the constitutionality of banking setoff. Jojola v. Wells Fargo Bank, Civil No.
C-71 900 (N.D. Cal., filed May 12, 1971). See also 36 CONSuMER REPORTS 190
(1971) (letter to the editor).
147. The Song-Beverly Credit Card Act now requires every card issuer to cor-
rect any billing error within 60 days after request is mailed. If the error is not
corrected, the card-issuer may not deduct this amount from the cardholder's account.
Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1019 § 4, enacting CAL. Crv. CoDE §§ 1747.50(a)-(b), 1747.60
(a)-(b).
148. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); see Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971); Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536,
552, 488 P.2d 13, 23, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 719 (1971).
Certain extraordinary situations have been recognized to merit this overriding
interest. E.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253 (1947); Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928) (assets of financial institutions seized by summary
proceedings due to near insolvency or mismanagement); Ewing v. Mytinger & Cassell-
berry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (misbranded drugs allowed to be seized by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921)
(prejudgment attachment of property of a nonresident by a resident creditor held
constitutional).
149. 5 Cal. 3d at 555, 488 P.2d at 25-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22.
150. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in Calijornia. A Study and Recommendations,
53 CAnF. L. REV. 1214, 124042 (1965); Comment, The Constitutional Validity of
Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837,
846 (1970).
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the effect of proscribing banking setoff, no unequivocal statement
can be made about the effect it would have on the credit industry. 1 '
The ultimate issue, however, is whether the desire for liberalized
credit is outweighed by allowing a practice devoid of procedural safe-
guards to perpetuate the private interests of the creditor bank.
The final contention asserted by the creditor in Randone might
also be utilized by an offsetting bank-i.e., the danger of a debtor
absconding with the money in his account when notified of the debt
action (or setoff) against him. Even this argument failed to impress
the court:
[A] creditor's interest, even in these "special circumstances," is
not sufficient to justify depriving a debtor of "necessities of life"
prior to a hearing on the merits of the creditor's claim.
152
Thus, the Randone court held that a creditor's private interest is never
sufficient when dealing with a debtor's "necessities of life."'15 If, there-
fore, the court is correct in listing bank accounts as "necessities of
life," the private interests of the offsetting bank should never be suffi-
cient to allow such a summary procedure as setoff. When a family is
dependent on the use of its checking account, setoff of past indebted-
ness without notice would enable the bank to "drive a debtor and his
family to the wall.'
154
Finally, it should be noted that there is no essential difference be-
tween wages in a bank account which is garnished and those in an ac-
count which is subject to setoff. Setoff is nothing more than a form of
nonstatutory, nonjudicial prejudgment attachment that permanently
freezes the "necessities of life" without even the minimal protection of
a later adjudication of rights which was always present in attachment
and garnishment proceedings. Setoff and attachment are so analogous
in both operation and effect that they defy differentiation-no doubt
because the substantive evils are no different.
Conclusion
Banking setoff has been an accepted commercial practice for cen-
turies, but "[tihe fact that a procedure would pass muster under a
feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all prop-
151. A BankAmericard official stated to the author in August, 1971, that he re-
cently answered, in the negative, a questionnaire whose purpose was to determine
whether banks would object to the repeal of the banker's lien. The official also
noted that setoff was only used as a "last resort" and "isn't very popular."
152. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556 n.19, 488 P.2d 13, 27 n.19, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 723 n.19.
153. Id. at 558, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
154. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
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erty in its modem forms."'15 5 The practice itself, however, is harm-
less, once the abuses are eliminated. There is no cogent argument
for disallowing setoff where the bank discloses its right in plain lan-
guage prior to exercise and has the prior consent of its customer. Sim-
ilarly, there is no reason why a bank and its depositor cannot con-
tract to give the bank the right, provided it is not a contract of adhe-
sion.
The present abuses, however, clearly require an overhaul of the
procedure. Setoff is an undisclosed security interest which generally
exalts the bank as a preferred creditor by allowing the peremptory
deprivation of the use by a customer of his bank account. The abuses
so summarized can be effectively restricted by a liberal, although justi-
fied, interpretation of the CCPA and UCCC and eliminated completely
by extending the principles of Sniadach a logical step further. Setoff
and attachment are both useful tools for the creditor and may remain
so provided they are not permitted to have a debilitating effect on
the consumer and other less fortunate creditors.
Thomas G. Dobyns*
155. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969); accord, Laprease
v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Port, J.).
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